"AI Startups" are over done (finally)

Duration

51:50

Captions

1

Language

EN

Published

Sep 18, 2025

Description

A lot of people think that these days investors will only ever invest in AI companies, but it's starting to look like that's not the case at all... Thank you Blacksmith for sponsoring! Check them out at: https://soydev.link/blacksmith SOURCE https://x.com/garrytan/status/1936559113414074557 Companies I mentioned: https://nautilus.co/ https://cocreate.so/ Want to sponsor a video? Learn more here: https://soydev.link/sponsor-me Check out my Twitch, Twitter, Discord more at https://t3.gg S/O Ph4se0n3 for the awesome edit 🙏

Captions (1)

00:00

As you guys probably know by now, I

00:01

invest in a decent number of early stage

00:03

startups that are building things in the

00:05

general space that we're all in. Which

00:06

means that a lot of these AI dev tools

00:08

that you guys see all the time are

00:10

things that when I'm able to, I reach

00:11

out to, try them out, and if I like

00:13

them, I throw some money their way so

00:14

that if they do succeed, I can make some

00:16

more money in the future. Which is why I

00:18

just invested in Nautilus, the car wash

00:21

platform that converts, captures, and

00:24

keeps members. What else did I invest in

00:27

in this batch? Um, co-create

00:30

professional first tooling for faster,

00:33

smarter, better video edits. These

00:36

aren't developer tools. What's going on?

00:39

Where did I even find these companies?

00:42

Well, uh, turns out I'm finding them

00:45

from Y Combinator. Because I was a Y

00:47

Combinator founder myself back in winter

00:49

of 22 before I was actually taking

00:50

YouTube very seriously. I went from one

00:52

of the biggest Y cominator haters to

00:54

somebody who saw a lot of the value in

00:55

it to slowly really really liking the

00:58

team, the vibes, and most of what goes

01:00

on over there. Joining YC is one of the

01:02

best things I ever did for myself, my

01:04

company, my YouTube channel, and now my

01:06

overall portfolio. It has been awesome

01:08

for me in almost every single measurable

01:10

way. So, why the hell am I investing in

01:12

a car wash company? I'm sure there was

01:14

lots of other dev tools and things in

01:16

this batch, right? Well, that's what

01:18

we're here to talk about today. There's

01:20

a lot of stereotypes about YC and also

01:23

about investors both like myself and

01:24

ones that are very different from me

01:26

about how we think about making new

01:28

companies. In particular, this idea that

01:31

AI is the future and all of these

01:33

businesses should be shoving AI into

01:35

everything if they want to make a lot of

01:36

money and raise a lot of money. But

01:38

things changed a lot with this most

01:40

recent batch. There has been a

01:42

significant vibe shift that I am very

01:45

excited to talk about with you guys

01:47

because a lot of your assumptions about

01:49

YC companies are correct. A lot aren't

01:52

correct, but most importantly, a lot of

01:53

the assumptions that both you and I have

01:55

have changed meaningfully, especially

01:57

with this most recent summer 2025 batch.

02:01

I can't wait to tell you more about what

02:02

I see is changing here and how it's

02:04

going to affect the hopefully entirety

02:06

of our industry, especially because I

02:08

want to make some money here. Well, if

02:09

you know anything about early stage

02:10

investments, you know they take 5 to 10

02:12

years to pay out. And I've only been

02:14

doing this for two. So, uh, my bank

02:16

account's running a little bit dry.

02:17

Quick break for a sponsor and then we'll

02:19

dive right in. You know what's worse

02:20

than spending all day waiting for your

02:22

code to build? Not knowing why it breaks

02:24

when it fails. I still cannot believe

02:26

just how bad GitHub actions have gotten.

02:28

But what if it could be better? What if

02:30

it was faster, cheaper, and actually

02:32

observable? Today's sponsor is here to

02:34

show you what that looks like because

02:35

Blacksmith is killing it. You make a

02:37

oneline change in your GitHub action and

02:38

all of a sudden life is better. Look at

02:40

all of the companies that have already

02:42

made the move from Clerk to Terso to

02:44

Superbase and more. They're faster

02:45

because they use gaming CPUs. That might

02:47

sound silly, but traditional server

02:49

processors have way more cores and way

02:52

lower clock speeds. A lot of the work we

02:54

do for compiling, even your fancy Rust

02:55

code bases, by the way, is very

02:57

singlethreaded. So having one fast

02:59

processor is actually quite a bit

03:00

better. Up to two times faster than

03:02

GitHub actions are traditionally. Cache

03:04

downloads are significantly faster and

03:06

Docker builds fly because they actually

03:08

cache the Docker layers on the NVME

03:10

drives that are in those same machines.

03:12

That would be enough by itself, but the

03:14

observability is more and more my

03:15

favorite part. Their dashboards are

03:17

great. You can see how big the failure

03:19

rates are on various things. You can

03:20

read through the logs with an actual

03:22

search and filter. Do you know how

03:24

useful this is if you have crazy builds

03:26

going on? It's at this point I just wish

03:28

GitHub would buy them because this is

03:29

how actions should work. If you're

03:31

running CI for your code, you deserve

03:33

better and your engineers do too. Check

03:35

them out today at sooyv.link/blacksmith.

03:38

So before we can go too far, I want to

03:40

give a brief like what is YC cuz I'm

03:42

sure some people watching this aren't

03:44

familiar. They probably even think and

03:46

I've seen this enough times that YC and

03:48

VC are the same thing. VC equals venture

03:52

capital is one of the many ways people

03:54

can invest money in hopes of getting

03:55

back more money in the future. Venture

03:57

capital is different from traditional

03:59

investing because you have to put in a

04:01

lot more money. You're taking a lot more

04:03

risk. The potential upside is much

04:04

higher, but your ability to get the cash

04:06

back and your overall liquidity is much

04:08

lower. When you invest in a company that

04:10

is early stage, you are effectively

04:12

handing the money to either get equity

04:15

or for a promise of future equity that

04:17

you cannot do anything with until a

04:19

certain amount of time has passed and a

04:20

certain number of things have happened.

04:22

If I own half of some really successful

04:25

company and they haven't IPOed yet, I

04:27

can't do anything with that stock. I'm

04:29

just sitting on it. It doesn't matter

04:30

how valuable they hypothetically are if

04:32

I can't do anything with the stock.

04:34

Whereas, if I go invest a bunch of money

04:35

into Nvidia and they jump 70%, I can

04:39

just sell it and I have my cash back in

04:40

a few minutes. That's the big difference

04:43

between venture capital style company

04:44

investment versus traditional stock

04:46

purchasing is you have given up all of

04:48

your ability to sell. And if the company

04:50

starts going down instead of up, you

04:52

can't do anything about it. You're along

04:54

for the ride. Which is why there are

04:56

such strict rules about who can and

04:57

can't invest in early stage startups.

04:59

It's a method of protecting people

05:01

because if you don't make enough money,

05:03

you don't have enough assets, and you

05:05

invest a bunch of money in these

05:06

startups and they start failing. You

05:08

can't get your money back. It is

05:10

incredibly rare for any of these early

05:12

stage startups to give money back to an

05:14

investor outside of failing and emptying

05:17

their bank account as they go bankrupt.

05:19

very very uncommon for people to get

05:21

their money back. But then if it does go

05:23

well and you invested in a company when

05:24

they were worth 20 mil and it turns out

05:25

they're 20 bill, you're doing pretty

05:27

well. So that's what venture capital is.

05:30

So what the hell is YC? YC is Y

05:32

Combinator. Y Combinator is kind of like

05:35

a boot camp for early stage startups. It

05:37

was built by Paul Graham back in the day

05:39

and it is still run actively in San

05:41

Francisco. Their goal is to help

05:42

earlystage companies, founders and

05:44

people who want to build some business

05:46

get the help they need. peers to run

05:49

alongside and then investment both from

05:51

Y Combinator as well as from other

05:53

potential VCs to get them accelerated

05:55

and going so they are most likely to

05:57

succeed with their business going

05:59

forward. Most early stage startups fail

06:02

aggressively. And why combinator through

06:05

a combination of how picky they are

06:06

about who they let in and the quality of

06:08

their whole accelerator process when you

06:11

go there in person for 3 months to learn

06:13

all about startups and how to run them

06:15

and scale them and get customers and all

06:17

of that. That process combined with

06:19

their pickiness results in a really high

06:21

successful pick rate for these Y

06:24

combinator companies. Here's a post from

06:26

Gary Tan. I'm very thankful he posted

06:28

the screenshot during one of the demo

06:29

day pitches because I would not have

06:31

permission to share this type of

06:32

screenshot. But since he has on Twitter,

06:34

you can tell it's a screenshot cuz it

06:36

has the iOS bar on the bottom and it's

06:38

also blurry as hell from Zoom. Now I'm

06:40

actually allowed to talk about this,

06:42

which is very, very fun. The returns for

06:44

investors who invested in early stage

06:46

companies in 2017, since then, the top

06:50

10% have had around a 3 1/2x return over

06:53

that time. So from 2017 to now, they

06:55

3.5x their money. The bottom 25% have

06:59

only added about 30% of their money

07:02

through their investments. 2017 was a

07:04

bit of a bull run with some really

07:05

successful companies. So a lot of

07:07

investors, even the worst ones, saw a

07:08

return there. But 2018 onwards, you'll

07:11

notice some things. Bottom 25%, so only

07:13

at about 6% improvement. 2019, 1%. 2020,

07:19

they're actually down 7% because they're

07:21

taking losses. 2021 they're down 13%.

07:25

Because they've had things go to zero

07:27

because all a startup can do it's like

07:28

it's not going to 2x. Most go to zero

07:31

and a few 10 to 100x. So your portfolio

07:35

is primarily composed of companies that

07:36

failed with the occasional one that wins

07:38

that boost it all up. So how does this

07:41

compare to YC's numbers for investors

07:43

that are focusing primarily on investing

07:45

through YC companies and two YC

07:47

companies? investors who have backed at

07:49

least three Y Combinator companies in

07:51

each demo day batch from 2018 through

07:53

2020.

07:54

The top 10% have 15xed their money. The

07:58

bottom 25% have still 3.3x their money.

08:02

The bottom 25% are doing as well as the

08:05

top 10% of nonc focused investors. YC

08:09

leads the industry. It is the best asset

08:11

class in venture. These are very, very

08:14

crazy numbers. If you're not familiar

08:16

with the term unicorn, it it means the

08:18

company reaches a billion plus dollar

08:20

valuation. And historically, each YC

08:23

batch has an average of a $6.5% unicorn

08:26

rate. Each investment either becomes a

08:28

success, in this case, unicorn, or it

08:30

doesn't, and it goes to zero. The

08:32

average valuation at demo day is around

08:34

$20 million post money save. So, it's

08:36

like the the value you're investing in.

08:38

This implies a 50x multiple needed to

08:40

achieve a1 billion plus dollar outcome.

08:42

point I'm trying to make here in

08:44

particular is that YC companies have a

08:46

very high chance of success. More

08:48

importantly, if you know about the

08:50

numbers YC takes, because YC gets 7% of

08:52

your company and a little bit extra on

08:55

top through an MFN, we don't need to go

08:56

in the details of the fundraising, but

08:57

they get between 7 and 11% of your

08:59

company. That's a huge amount of take,

09:01

especially for a less than great amount

09:03

of money. They only do 500K and 125K of

09:05

that is for the 7%. So, that's kind of

09:07

insane. But if you look at the value of

09:10

the average company that goes through YC

09:12

versus the ones that don't, you see some

09:14

crazy things. YC's round sizes are 23%

09:17

larger. Their valuations are 65.7%

09:20

higher. And their ARR for when these

09:23

companies are getting invested. So their

09:24

actual revenue is 63% lower. So YC

09:28

average round size for a YC company 3

09:30

million, average valuation 25 million,

09:32

average AR 100K. So 3 mil over 25 you're

09:36

getting about 10% dilution a little bit

09:38

more than that versus a nonc company 2.5

09:42

million raised 15 mil cap 3x the ARR so

09:46

you have to make three times more money

09:48

to raise slightly less money at a

09:51

significantly lower cap you're giving up

09:53

almost double the percentage of your

09:55

company by not going through YC from

09:57

your first round alone that 7% ends up

10:00

being worth it YC is a surprisingly good

10:02

value for what it is. And that is why Y

10:05

Combinator has stayed as relevant as

10:06

they have and also why they've made many

10:09

changes throughout. When I did YC, they

10:11

were doing two batches a year. Every

10:13

winter and every summer, they had a

10:16

3-month window where a bunch of

10:17

companies flew to San Francisco, moved

10:19

there, and then went through the batch,

10:21

learned as much as they could about

10:23

startups, got thrown in front of a ton

10:24

of investors at the end on a day called

10:26

demo day. And now they get to pitch to

10:28

these investors what they were building,

10:29

how much money they're making, and what

10:31

they need to succeed so they can

10:32

hopefully get investments in auction

10:35

style to increase the value of each of

10:36

those companies so they can go off and

10:38

hopefully make millions of dollars and

10:40

become a billion dollar plus company. So

10:42

previously we had those two batches, one

10:45

every 6 months. That was a three-month

10:46

window and they had 3 months off. Those

10:48

batches had increasingly large numbers

10:50

of companies. Like when I was doing it,

10:51

if I recall, it was in the 3 to 400

10:54

company range. Now they've knocked it

10:55

down a bunch to around 120 to 140

10:58

companies. But they also doubled the

11:01

number of batches. So they do one every

11:03

three months now. Winter, spring,

11:05

summer, and fall. The summer batch just

11:07

finished and the fall batch is just

11:09

starting. Now that introduced a very

11:12

interesting change. The number of

11:14

companies being like let's say

11:15

hypothetically

11:17

50,000 companies apply. So we have 50k

11:20

companies. If we're accepting the top

11:23

400 or so, like they did for my batch,

11:25

I'll nug it to 40k. So, it's the top

11:27

400. So, they take the top 400 of the

11:30

40k. That's about a 1% pick rate. YC's

11:34

pick rates are historically much lower

11:36

than even the hardest to get into

11:37

colleges. So, this has resulted in

11:39

problems where a lot of the people who

11:40

are hunting for the prestige of getting

11:42

into Harvard end up going ham trying to

11:44

get into Y Combinator because they've

11:46

just had their brains rotted with like

11:47

prestige hunting. Very weirdly common.

11:50

Not my thing at all. I don't give a [ __ ]

11:51

about prestige or credentials or any of

11:52

that. I just want to see what you're

11:53

doing. So, that part's not interesting

11:55

to me. But the fact that this pick rate

11:57

is 1%. Means that they are already

11:59

cutting out the majority of the options

12:02

that they had, the majority of the

12:04

companies that could have went through.

12:06

And I'm not saying that there aren't

12:08

good companies in the other 39,600

12:11

that applied. In fact, some of the best

12:13

companies out of the whole 40,000 are

12:15

going to be rejected. That's a cost they

12:17

choose to eat because they want to have

12:19

a good enough filter to increase the

12:21

likelihood that this 400 is at least one

12:24

standard deviation better than the

12:27

overall pile of ones they did not pick.

12:29

That was a 1% acceptance rate. But

12:32

things have changed. One, more batches.

12:35

So they're doing multiple batches a year

12:37

now. Four instead of two. Point two,

12:39

this one's really important. The number

12:41

of companies they're accepting has went

12:42

down, not up. They're only letting in

12:44

120 to 140. But most importantly, one

12:46

that you might suspect, the number of

12:50

applications has gone up significantly.

12:53

There are way more companies applying

12:55

than ever. I've heard numbers as crazy

12:56

as like a 100,000 companies applying per

12:59

batch. It's kind of insane how high the

13:02

application rates have gotten,

13:04

especially when you consider how low the

13:05

acceptance rates are. So went from 400

13:07

over I made up 40k. It's probably like

13:09

60, but you went from like a little

13:11

under 1%.

13:14

140 companies over 100,000 apps. Now

13:18

we're at like.14%.

13:21

We're in an entirely different world. I

13:24

don't know about you guys, but if

13:25

there's any quality to their process of

13:28

picking, which we've seen the numbers,

13:30

there is. If I have the choice to pick

13:32

between the top 400 of 40,000 or the top

13:35

140 of 100,000, there's a very good

13:38

chance that if you're picking from this

13:39

set, you're going to do very well. And

13:42

also, there's a good chance you're

13:43

picking from this set, you're still

13:44

going to do pretty damn well. This is

13:46

fun for a handful of reasons. One of

13:48

which is to go back to this post. These

13:51

numbers are based on 2018 to 2020 where

13:55

the pick rate was much higher. more

13:57

companies were getting in against a

13:59

smaller set of applications. If I was to

14:01

be frank, if the Theo that applied to YC

14:04

in 2021 that got in for Winter22, the

14:07

Theo that had recently quit his job at

14:09

Twitch had not worked much at other

14:12

companies beyond a little bit of AWS

14:13

stuff and Microsoft stuff. Didn't have a

14:15

YouTube or a Twitter that was relevant,

14:17

was just building tools for creators.

14:20

It's not that surprising I snuck in

14:21

here. Twitch as an XYC company, me as a

14:24

person who can speak well in interviews

14:25

and write decently well. Fight it all

14:28

you want of the types of people who

14:30

applied to YC at the time, I was within

14:32

the 1% you would think is most likely to

14:36

succeed. If you know the history of the

14:38

companies I worked at and you liked the

14:40

way I talked, it makes sense that people

14:42

would pick me, especially because our

14:43

revenue was going pretty fast at the

14:44

time. I understand why I would end up in

14:46

that top like 2,000 that get interviews

14:49

and the top 400 who get in. I would not

14:51

get into YC right now if I was the

14:52

person I was then. Theo from 2021 would

14:55

not get into YC now because it is

14:58

significantly harder to do so and I was

15:00

lucky to sneak in in the first place.

15:02

The bar is much higher. That is a good

15:04

thing if you like investing. That said,

15:06

there were problems. There's a lot of

15:08

stereotypes about VCs and also Y

15:10

Combinator in particular. Like if we're

15:12

being real, the vast majority of these

15:13

companies are basically just chatbt

15:16

rappers. Not that I would know anything

15:18

about a chat GPT rapper, but there is

15:21

some depth to this statement that is

15:23

important to understand. The capability

15:25

of AI is really cool, especially when

15:28

applied the right way. But there are

15:30

also problems. If you don't understand

15:33

the thing that you're trying to add AI

15:35

to well, you're going to do some stupid

15:37

things. Let's take our perspective here

15:40

as developers. I don't know about y'all,

15:42

but for me, AI first really felt useful

15:45

when I tried Co-Pilot for the first

15:47

time. I have a whole video of my

15:49

reaction to, "Oh my god, Co-Pilot's

15:50

actually really good. What the hell?" I

15:52

I had no idea it was going to be that

15:53

good, especially that early on back in

15:55

what, I think it was 2022.

15:57

Never would have expected what happened

15:58

there. C-Pilot was a really good thing

16:01

to have introduced us to AI because it

16:04

wasn't taking anything from us. Copilot

16:07

would be introduced to the editor that

16:09

many of us were already using as a thing

16:11

that just happens that tab completes as

16:13

you're writing. It's not taking away the

16:15

planning process. It's not taking away

16:17

the reading of the code. It's not taking

16:18

away the actual working in the codebase.

16:21

It's just autocompleting a little bit of

16:23

the typing as you write your code to

16:25

solve your problems. You couldn't even

16:27

tell it what to do beyond writing a

16:28

comment in your code and hoping it would

16:30

use that comment to do the right thing.

16:32

That was as far as you could go. But by

16:34

doing it that way, it never felt

16:36

threatening. It never felt like the AI

16:38

was trying to replace the things that we

16:40

do or the things that we like. And we

16:42

all got introduced in a way that felt

16:44

like it it matched what we wanted and

16:46

what we were doing. It made the boring

16:48

parts easier to do. It didn't get in the

16:50

way of the fun parts. But most

16:52

importantly, and I hope this isn't

16:55

controversial, Copilot was built by

16:57

developers for developers. Duh, right?

17:00

Like obviously devs built the thing.

17:02

Devs build things and obviously devs use

17:05

it. It's a dev tool. There's an

17:06

important thing here. And yes, it's

17:09

obvious. The arrows shouldn't be

17:11

necessary. Copilot was built by

17:12

developers for developers. Let's make up

17:16

a company. Let's say there's a company

17:19

that wants to make AI for flower shops.

17:23

We'll call it flower flowi. Flowy. We

17:27

have flowy flowers but we we make it

17:30

easier for flower shops to manage their

17:31

customers with AI. Now imagine this

17:34

flowi was built by devs for flower

17:37

shops. This type of thing was very very

17:41

common for us to see because co-pilot

17:44

went so well. It seems like adding AI to

17:47

things that are hard to do is inherently

17:49

pretty valuable. And as such, one of the

17:53

most common formats for startups that we

17:54

were seeing at Y Combinator was co-pilot

17:58

for X. And no, I do not mean X.com.

18:00

Please stop. I mean X as in a variable

18:03

for some random thing. Copilot for thing

18:07

was the whole brand of I think two or

18:09

three different Y combinator patches.

18:12

The problem was that a lot of the people

18:13

building this were developers, recent

18:16

college grads, people who love AI and

18:18

know a bunch about the cool stuff going

18:20

on with LLMs, people who know a lot

18:21

about infra and AWS and those types of

18:23

things, but they didn't necessarily know

18:26

about the thing that they were building

18:28

for like flower shops. Another

18:30

interesting one was a company that

18:33

founders were recent college grads, had

18:35

never worked real jobs in the industry

18:37

and they were trying to do co-pilot for

18:41

product management. So obviously they're

18:43

product managers and they saw some

18:45

problems they wanted to solve with AI,

18:46

right? Nope. They had never had a

18:48

product manager. They had never worked

18:49

at a company with a product manager.

18:50

They barely understood what one was.

18:52

They thought they had identified a hole

18:54

in the market and that they would fill

18:55

it. And this is a very common mistake

18:58

that Y Combinator companies make. But

19:00

more importantly, startups in general

19:03

make this all of the time. They see a

19:05

solution that works for them in a space

19:07

they care about and they try to apply it

19:09

in spaces that they do not understand at

19:11

all. Very common. The equivalent of this

19:14

would be imagine if the first time that

19:17

developer tooling was using AI instead

19:19

of it integrating into our tool, some

19:22

non-dev person, I don't know, some like

19:26

CEO of Salesforce or something that

19:28

doesn't know anything about code comes

19:30

in and says, "We're going to replace all

19:32

of your developers with AI. We built an

19:34

agentic tool that knows [ __ ] and Python

19:37

really well and is going to replace all

19:39

of your code bases with our new magical

19:42

AI. How many devs are going to try out

19:44

that [ __ ] thing? The answer is none.

19:47

Because nobody is trying to replace

19:49

themselves at their job. They're trying

19:50

to make the boring parts less boring,

19:52

the hard parts less hard, and the fun

19:54

parts more relevant in their day-to-day

19:56

lives. And that was what Copilot did

19:58

well. So obviously why combinator

20:01

companies had to adjust because too many

20:02

of them were making these types of

20:04

mistakes. And they did. They moved from

20:06

co-pilot for thing to a much much better

20:10

cursor for thing. That solves all the

20:13

problems, right? Because cursor is

20:14

definitely not the same thing or

20:18

possibly even worse because it takes

20:19

over more of the work and leaves you

20:20

less of the fun parts to do. That

20:22

wouldn't be that couldn't happen. The

20:25

place where I saw this pattern the most,

20:27

at least the place that affected me and

20:28

I cared about the most was in video. I

20:31

cannot tell you how many video AI

20:34

companies I have talked to that went

20:35

through my combinator that were people

20:38

who either didn't make content or didn't

20:41

like or care about content that decided

20:44

everyone would be a YouTuber or an

20:46

influencer. If only it was easier to

20:49

make videos. Editing is too hard. That's

20:52

the reason nobody is out here making

20:54

videos. If we made it easier, everyone

20:56

would be a creator.

20:59

Uh, the reason nobody's a software

21:02

engineer is because typing is too hard.

21:04

It's way too hard to use a keyboard. If

21:06

only we made keyboards easier, everyone

21:08

would be a developer, right? Do you see

21:11

how stupid that sounds? You know how

21:13

often I would hear pitches that sound

21:15

like that? I won't say it was the

21:17

majority of companies, but it definitely

21:20

felt like the bottom 30 to 40 percentile

21:22

was stuff like that. I cannot tell you

21:25

how many times I had the co-pilot for

21:27

thing, cursor for thing, AI assistant

21:30

for thing conversations where they

21:32

understood the AI part, the co-pilot

21:35

part really well, but they didn't

21:37

understand jack [ __ ] about the other

21:39

side. This is the thing that changed in

21:42

this batch. It was a change that was

21:44

already starting to brew due to the

21:46

nature of how much pickier they're

21:48

getting with their acceptance rates, but

21:50

also because I'm pretty sure YC noticed

21:53

the same trend. They were investing in

21:54

these companies that were doing AI for a

21:56

thing, but they didn't really understand

21:58

that thing very well. I understand why

22:01

seeing this trend, you would assume that

22:02

Y Combinator encourages this. They

22:04

actually do the exact opposite. Here is

22:08

Gary Tan's thoughts on this from before.

22:11

the the most important part of design, I

22:14

think, is actually the empathy for the

22:15

user. Like, you sort of have to be like

22:17

an ethnographer. Um, you're going in and

22:20

seeing, you know, what is this person

22:22

like? What are their goals? What are

22:24

their motivations? If you're selling

22:26

enterprise software, the most important

22:27

question is how do they get promoted?

22:29

Mhm.

22:30

>> And so if you can actually do all of

22:32

those things, load it into your head, uh

22:34

you know, whether it's having actually

22:36

lived that life or being able to be

22:39

around people all the time who uh live

22:42

that life, only then can you design

22:44

something that um is appreciably 10x

22:48

better than the thing that they were

22:49

doing before.

22:50

>> Kind of to that, I know IC's been at

22:52

least public about advising founders or

22:54

would be founders to like go work in a

22:56

call center, go, you know, do some of

22:58

this

23:00

Exactly. Go undercover to like develop

23:01

that empathy. Um, are folks taking you

23:04

up on that?

23:04

>> Yeah, totally. I mean, there was a

23:06

company recently, I mean, this is one of

23:08

the cool things about uh open-source

23:10

large language models. We had a medical

23:12

billing company where one of the

23:14

co-founders went and got a job as a

23:16

medical biller on Zoom

23:19

>> and uh, you know, they were able to

23:21

write software and write prompts and

23:23

like deeply understand what is it that a

23:25

medical biller does. they did it in a

23:28

way that um you know didn't violate

23:30

anything because none of the data it was

23:32

it's sort of like

23:33

>> uh they were just doing the job and

23:35

instead of you know them using their

23:37

wetwware to do the job they were writing

23:40

software locally using uh you know I

23:42

think the latest version of meta's llama

23:45

and so I think that that was an

23:47

incredible example obviously the best

23:49

way is to deeply understand someone's

23:52

problem or a space and go in and um you

23:55

know totally above board, understand

23:57

things. But sometimes you might not need

23:59

to do that. You could go undercover and

24:01

just do that job directly and then

24:04

deeply understand it.

24:05

>> I love this. It's really hard to improve

24:08

a job that you do not understand.

24:11

>> Building software for users that you do

24:13

not get, that you do not empathize with,

24:15

that are not you is really, really hard.

24:20

Y Combinator's whole motto has always

24:22

been build something people want. That

24:24

is much easier to do if you want the

24:25

thing. But if you don't, you don't

24:27

understand it should at least go get a

24:29

job in the space so that you can

24:31

understand how others do it. And they've

24:33

been encouraging this for a while

24:34

because they're actually very tired of

24:36

this of co-pilot for thing. Meaning they

24:38

don't understand thing. They only

24:40

understand AI. And this is how the shift

24:43

has happened. If we were to rank AI

24:45

startups in Y Combinator by how well

24:47

they know AI versus how well they know

24:50

thing and we were to do this batch for

24:52

batch recent batches have overall looked

24:56

kind of like this. They know AI pretty

24:59

damn well but thing which I would argue

25:01

is the important part the thing they're

25:03

actually building for they don't

25:05

understand that well and I hate this. I

25:08

go out of my way to not invest in

25:10

companies that look like this, where

25:12

they really deeply understand AI. They

25:14

can go toe-to-toe with people like me

25:16

about every detail about the new models,

25:17

what they do, what they can't do, all

25:18

the cool tooling and things that happen

25:20

in the AI world. If this is what your

25:22

spread looks like when you're building

25:23

AI for thing, and you know thing too

25:26

poorly and AI really well, I'm out.

25:28

You've lost my interest. I'm not doing

25:31

it. And this was very common for a

25:33

while. But a shift has happened. This

25:36

batch felt fundamentally different. It

25:40

now feels like this. Multiple companies

25:43

in this batch admitted that they were

25:45

actually a bit shy about AI. They felt

25:46

like they were behind and they didn't

25:48

really understand it. They'd only

25:49

started getting into it for real a few

25:51

months before. That sounds like a red

25:53

flag until you realize that I also

25:55

wasn't into AI until late December of

25:57

last year. And by January of this year,

25:59

I had one of the most successful AI apps

26:01

in the space. And by March, my research

26:02

was being cited in various things. I

26:04

could spend a much longer time ranting

26:06

about how most of the AI influencers and

26:09

sources of information are absolute hot

26:11

[ __ ] garbage. I'm not exceptionally

26:13

talented for figuring it out in 2 to 3

26:16

months. Everybody else just kind of

26:17

sucked. So being early to AI and being

26:21

really deep on AI is often a

26:23

disadvantage because things change

26:25

really fast. Things aren't necessarily

26:27

relevant to your space. And most

26:28

importantly, as the AI tools get better,

26:30

your need to understand the AI well

26:32

actually goes down. But your need to

26:35

understand the business you're building

26:36

in only ever goes up. And that's how we

26:39

end up on Nautilus, one of my favorite

26:43

companies from the recent batch that I

26:44

just can't really shut up about because

26:46

I find what they're doing so genuinely

26:48

cool and interesting. Nautilus is a car

26:50

wash platform. They're kind of like

26:52

QuickBooks. They're kind of like Square

26:54

Pay. They're kind of like all the things

26:56

you need to run a small store anywhere

26:59

in the world, but specific for car

27:01

washes. That sounds really dumb, right?

27:03

Like, why wouldn't they just use the

27:05

existing solutions that are generic and

27:06

probably cheaper and work well for

27:07

everyone? The reason is because car

27:10

washes have specific needs and also

27:12

specific opportunities to make more

27:13

money. Things like memberships. How many

27:16

people in my Twitch chat have a

27:18

membership to a car wash? One if you do

27:22

and two if you don't. That's a lot of

27:24

people who drive that don't have

27:26

subscriptions to their car wash. There's

27:28

been about three so far that do.

27:32

That's a huge opportunity. That's a way

27:34

for these car washes to go from just

27:36

barely profitable to potentially quite

27:38

profitable. And if this is software that

27:41

can be sold to a car wash, so that they

27:44

need fewer employees, they need fewer

27:45

subscriptions, and they have a

27:47

membership program that will

27:48

automatically send a text out saying,

27:50

"Hey, you're overdue a car wash." And

27:52

things like that to make it more likely

27:54

that the car wash can make more money.

27:56

This is worth a ton of money to all of

27:58

those car washes.

28:00

So, how did they make this? How do they

28:02

know all of this? The founder has been

28:05

working at car washes since he was 16

28:07

years old. He integrated all of these

28:09

things as the cashier at a car wash when

28:11

he was 17 years old. He ran into so many

28:14

problems with the software and saw so

28:15

many opportunities in the space that he

28:17

started building Nautilus to make that

28:19

car wash and others nearby even easier

28:22

to manage. And he succeeded. And then YC

28:26

let in, as far as I know, their first

28:28

ever car wash company. And this kid

28:30

shows up in a [ __ ] sailor outfit and

28:33

hat and pitches his car wash in a sea of

28:36

AI dev tools. It was magical. It was

28:39

powerful. It was exciting. And then he

28:41

comes up to me at the end and says, "Oh

28:42

my god, Theo, your videos helped me so

28:44

much when I was trying to level up and

28:45

like build the thing I built." And then

28:47

I heard what they were doing. And then I

28:49

heard how much money they're making. And

28:51

I invested immediately without any

28:53

further questions because these guys

28:55

know car washes really well. They didn't

28:58

know the AI and developer side that

29:00

well, but they found the resources to

29:02

figure it out, people like me. And they

29:04

combined their their knowledge of car

29:06

washes. And I was chatting with them at

29:08

one point with like other people. And

29:09

somebody asked like, "How do you get all

29:10

these car washes to sign up?" Because

29:11

they have like a few thousand, I think,

29:13

that are already using their stuff. and

29:15

a ton of like big brands are moving all

29:18

of their like actual shops over. They're

29:20

doing very very well with it. So,

29:22

somebody asked, "How do you actually get

29:24

these companies to adopt your car wash

29:26

software?" They said that one of their

29:28

biggest leads is their regular

29:30

appearances on wash talk on carwash.com

29:33

the podcast as well as the thing that

29:36

they had on their website, the webinars

29:38

that they do, as well as the car wash

29:40

events and conferences they go to. There

29:42

is a whole world of car wash content, of

29:45

car wash events, of car wash CRM and

29:47

webinars and all of this [ __ ] that none

29:49

of us know a [ __ ] thing about. We are

29:51

talking about a different world here.

29:53

And if you look at my chat's reaction to

29:55

all of this, OMG

29:58

or OMFG, uh, that's so cool. On today's

30:02

episode of the Car Wash Podcast,

30:05

you get it. It's kind of nuts, but

30:08

that's why these guys are going to win.

30:11

They're not going to win because they're

30:12

the industry leading experts in AI.

30:14

They're not going to win because they're

30:15

first. They're actually quite late to

30:17

the space. They're not going to win by

30:18

making a solution that literally every

30:20

single company in the world can use.

30:21

They're going to win by making it so a

30:23

car wash can make two times more money.

30:25

Being the best solution for them by far

30:26

and the only one they even know about,

30:28

much less consider. And now they can

30:30

charge 10 times more than QuickBooks

30:32

does because it doubles their revenue.

30:34

And despite having 100th the customers

30:36

that QuickBooks has, they'll be able to

30:37

have one their [ __ ] revenue. That is

30:40

crazy. People underestimate how many

30:43

weird niche subfields of sub fields

30:44

there are out there. Absolutely. But

30:47

there was a problem with this before.

30:49

The problem before was that a sub field

30:53

would need the same amount of

30:54

engineering effort as the greater higher

30:57

level field. Didn't make sense to build

30:58

something like Verscell before AWS. It

31:01

didn't make sense for a while after

31:03

either because the number of engineers

31:04

it would take to build something like

31:06

AWS was too high. things like AWS,

31:09

things like Verscell, things like AI,

31:11

things like React. One of the effects of

31:13

all of these tools is they allow for a

31:15

smaller number of people to build a

31:17

similar piece of software. The number of

31:19

engineers it takes to build and maintain

31:20

big applications goes down every single

31:23

year. The number of devs these companies

31:25

have go up because the number of things

31:27

they're doing goes up. But if you want

31:28

to take a product that exists today and

31:30

rebuild it next year, it'll be easier.

31:33

If you take a product that was built 10

31:34

years ago and rebuild it now, it'll take

31:37

you 150th the engineers to do a pretty

31:39

good job. And that's the bet that a lot

31:41

of these startups are making. This is

31:43

actually a good question. I think I got

31:44

a bit disconnected. A quick Google

31:47

search says the car wash industry is 24

31:49

billion. They may know car washes really

31:51

well, but it's a billion dollar company.

31:53

Absolutely. You don't need to make a

31:54

billion a year to make be a billion

31:55

dollar company. You need to have good

31:57

profit on like 150 mil a year. So 150

32:00

mil a year divided by 24 billion. They

32:05

only need to capture 6% of the total

32:08

spend in the industry in order to be a

32:11

billion dollar company. And if they

32:13

actually can increase the amount of

32:14

money the industry is worth because all

32:16

of their customers are able to double

32:17

their average revenue per customer, this

32:19

might go from a $ 24 billion industry to

32:21

a $40 billion industry and they can

32:23

capture a significant portion of that

32:25

revenue. Why such a high multiple?

32:27

because they are probably printing

32:29

profit off that. Like what are the costs

32:31

for a business like what they are doing?

32:33

They don't have very many employees.

32:35

They don't have very much

32:36

infrastructure. They don't have very

32:37

high costs. If a customer pays them 500

32:39

bucks a month, they're probably spending

32:42

$15 in that month. I don't know any of

32:44

these numbers. I haven't talked with any

32:45

of them about any of these things. It's

32:46

just my understanding of how businesses

32:49

like this operate. Their cost margins

32:52

are going to be crazy. Their profit's

32:53

going to be insane. Their ability to win

32:56

a significant portion of the industry is

32:57

absurd. And if they decide to, they can

32:59

increase the amount they charge and

33:01

nobody can say no because they're the

33:02

best solution by far. They are in an

33:04

incredibly powerful position right now.

33:07

Another similar example is co-create. As

33:10

I mentioned before, there have been a

33:12

lot of companies doing AI video tools to

33:15

make it easier for people who don't know

33:16

a thing about video to make a crappy Tik

33:19

Tok that gets five views. Those products

33:21

have no place in this world and they

33:22

will all die aggressively and quickly.

33:24

They piss me off a lot. I cannot tell

33:27

you how many times I've had to sit in

33:29

the YC office with a random video

33:31

company trying to get me to invest in

33:32

them where I had to explain, "You guys

33:35

do not know a single [ __ ] thing about

33:37

video. Your business is fundamentally

33:38

doomed." The big thing I had to explain

33:41

is that the things that make editing

33:43

slow have very little to do with opening

33:45

the editor, moving files around, and

33:47

cutting. When Faze, my editor, gets

33:50

access to our assets, he can edit an

33:52

hourong video in like 40 to 50 minutes.

33:56

Hi, FaZe. Faze, if somebody was to tell

33:59

you that they would replace Final Cut

34:01

with an AI that auto chops the video for

34:04

you, what would your honest reaction be?

34:07

How much fixing am I doing after?

34:09

Probably a lot. And now you have to use

34:10

their jank Electron app that doesn't

34:12

have any of the things you need that

34:14

crashes when you put 4K videos in.

34:16

You're in for a bad time. Now imagine

34:18

somebody tells you, "Hey, we're building

34:20

a solution because we were video editors

34:22

for years and we found that managing our

34:24

assets and synchronizing them was

34:26

obnoxious."

34:27

Start to make a little bit more sense.

34:30

This is the first video company I have

34:32

talked to in the startup world, period,

34:35

that mentions things like time code on

34:37

their website. They have string outs.

34:39

They'll assemble a timeline based on the

34:41

content in natural language, creating a

34:42

string out in daily for the daily

34:44

recording session you did to see what's

34:46

worth taking or not taking to trivialize

34:48

the process. Export it to your

34:49

professional editing software of choice.

34:51

Running all of this locally so none of

34:53

your content is being sent to a random

34:55

cloud somewhere with AVYNC again with

34:57

time code and things like that all built

34:59

in automated organization and management

35:01

for these giant recording processes that

35:04

have thousands of hours of footage. And

35:07

as my editor has said, this is great for

35:10

AI grouping and stuff. Sounds like

35:12

awesome for pros, for people in real

35:14

productions. Absolutely. We had to go

35:16

the opposite direction on my channel

35:17

where those types of things were so

35:19

annoying that I built my whole process

35:21

with my markers, my external system, my

35:23

breaking things up via CSVs and then

35:25

dumping them on my Dropbox so that my

35:27

editor can access them. We built that

35:29

whole system because all of the

35:30

orchestration of your content is the

35:32

annoying part. takes us more time to

35:34

make sure the right files are tagged in

35:36

the right place than it takes for us to

35:38

actually edit the video. And you

35:40

wouldn't know this if you weren't a

35:41

video editor and you didn't spend a lot

35:43

of time talking to actual video

35:45

creators. This is so common. And it was

35:48

so nice to sit with a YC company that

35:51

was going through the batch doing video

35:53

product that literally had just gotten

35:55

back from New York because they flew out

35:57

and sat on the floor of a big edit

35:59

warehouse with like 15 full-timers just

36:02

doing pre-editing, orchestration, like

36:05

assistant editors just making sure the

36:06

right assets were in the right place and

36:08

making all of their jobs 2x easier. This

36:11

is a real video company. This isn't an

36:14

aspiring creator company. I am so tired

36:17

of the aspiring businesses. We want to

36:19

make it so everyone can program because

36:21

programming is too hard. We want to make

36:23

it so everyone can be an influencer

36:25

because editing is too hard for

36:27

influencers to do. We want to make it so

36:29

anyone can make a viral post because

36:30

coming up with posts is too hard. All of

36:33

these things are stupid and none of

36:34

these things will work. And the only way

36:36

you can think this way about any

36:37

industry is if you are here, if you are

36:40

done in Krugerging yourself because you

36:42

tried to be an influencer, you tried to

36:44

be a developer. You found it too hard,

36:47

so you gave up and then decided you

36:49

could make a business selling the

36:51

solution to other people who gave up.

36:53

The harsh reality is the people who give

36:55

up are not good customers. The people

36:57

who give up are not good to build

36:59

around. If your business's average

37:01

customer is an aspiring thing, not the

37:04

thing, you're doomed. And this is what I

37:07

realized when I built my Y Combinator

37:08

startup, Ping. Even though we were

37:10

focused on building for professionals,

37:12

the ping.gg GG video product very

37:15

quickly became used primarily by small

37:18

hobbyists. People who aspired to be a

37:20

successful creator. They couldn't figure

37:22

out why nobody cared about their stuff.

37:24

So their solution to solve this problem

37:26

was to use professional expensive tools

37:29

like ping in hopes that if their quality

37:31

of video went up, they'd go from five

37:33

viewers to 50. Aspiring spaces are evil.

37:36

They are full of what we call tarpets.

37:39

All of these things sound like a good

37:40

idea until you understand the space at

37:42

all or you think about it a little bit

37:43

more deeply. And this trend has existed

37:45

in most startup spaces, but in

37:47

particular, I have seen this a lot in YC

37:49

startups.

37:51

Not in this batch. Many companies looked

37:55

like this. One more fun example that you

37:57

devs can probably relate to. We've all

37:59

seen the AI vibe coding apps. Most of

38:02

them are built on top of React Native

38:03

because React is something that's easy

38:05

for AIs to write. So, React Native with

38:07

enough rappers means you can vibe code a

38:09

mobile app relatively easily. There's a

38:11

bunch of these. Disclosure, I'm invested

38:12

in most of them. So, if I put a name

38:14

down, assume I am at this point for the

38:15

vibe coding stuff. There's ro.app,

38:18

there's a zero.app,

38:21

there's vibecoder,

38:23

there's others I'm forgetting for mobile

38:25

apps specifically, but these were and I

38:27

think still are the big three. All of

38:30

these companies were built by people who

38:31

were pretty nerdy about mobile, like A

38:34

in particular. Those devs were two

38:36

friends in high school that made dozens

38:37

of apps together and they built a zero

38:39

to make it easier to build apps. But now

38:42

there's an interesting one. Bit rig.

38:45

Build apps for your phone on your phone.

38:48

You might notice how basic this website

38:50

is. The reason is because unlike all of

38:53

the other vibe app companies, these guys

38:56

do not understand web for [ __ ] And

38:59

that's okay because they're not building

39:01

a web company. They're not building an

39:03

AI company. They're building an app

39:05

builder company. And ready for some very

39:07

fun facts about Bitrigg. Bitriig is the

39:10

only one of these AI app companies that

39:12

I know of that isn't building apps with

39:15

React Native. Bit Rig is using Swift UI

39:19

because they think that Vivecoded Apps

39:21

should meet the native bar that they

39:23

care a lot about. But what do they know

39:25

about Swift UI? What do they know about

39:27

native apps? Why are they coming in?

39:28

Because this is just AI for that, right?

39:30

Ready for the fun spoiler? The creators,

39:33

I [ __ ] you not, are the creators of

39:35

Swift UI. The people who made SwiftUI

39:38

left Apple and built a vibe coding

39:40

platform to make Swift UI apps. Imagine

39:43

competing with the creators of Swift UI

39:46

in vibe coding, building native apps.

39:48

They admitted to me when we chatted that

39:50

they did not really feel like they

39:52

understood marketing or AI stuff very

39:54

well going in and they were doing their

39:55

best to learn it. They asked awesome

39:57

questions in particular about branding

39:58

and marketing stuff. I immediately

40:00

invested as much as they would take from

40:01

me. And now they're getting a big moment

40:03

as I mentioned them here. If you want to

40:05

build native mobile apps and you're

40:07

interested in real native apps by people

40:10

who understand the platform better than

40:12

anyone else in the godamn world, Bitrig

40:15

are those people. It's worth a shot. And

40:18

this is also fun for me because I

40:19

personally honestly think React Native

40:21

is more than good enough. But if I am

40:23

wrong and all three of these investments

40:25

fail because React Native is not good

40:27

enough for vibe coding a mobile app, now

40:29

I have a hedge bet with Bit Rigg that

40:31

will cover the difference. If I am

40:33

lucky, one to four of these four

40:36

companies will end up giving me a 10 to

40:38

100x return in approximately 8 to 10

40:42

years. I have nothing to gain at this

40:45

point in time beyond thinking these

40:47

things are cool. I'm not promoting these

40:49

companies because I invested in them. I

40:51

am talking about them because I want you

40:52

to understand what this vibe shift was

40:54

and why I'm interested in them. And

40:56

really fun question from chat. What if

40:59

flutter wins? Really good question. I

41:01

actually also had invested in two

41:03

separate Flutter companies. Of the many

41:05

companies I've invested in, only three

41:08

have gone to zero. And of the three that

41:10

have actually went bankrupt and I was

41:12

able to claim the losses on my taxes,

41:15

two of the three were the two Flutter

41:17

companies.

41:19

So yeah, Flutter will not be the winner

41:22

because Flutter can't even get out of

41:24

early stage. I do invest in things I

41:27

don't agree with because I want to hedge

41:29

my bets. If there is a company that is

41:32

doing a thing that I think is obviously

41:33

wrong and most of my portfolio is built

41:36

against, I will invest on the off chance

41:38

they are right and I am wrong. Actually,

41:40

we have to touch on one of my favorite

41:41

things about this batch, too. As I've

41:44

been saying, the AI for thing companies

41:46

know a lot about thing and don't know a

41:47

lot about AI. You would imagine that

41:49

these companies probably aren't the most

41:51

experienced developers if they're

41:52

building a car wash company. The really

41:55

interesting trend I saw was for the

41:57

first time in any batch, all of these AI

42:00

for thing companies were really hyped to

42:02

have me there. Nobody outside of SF

42:04

knows who I am. But when I go to demo

42:07

day, I get a decent number of photo

42:09

requests. People who come up asking

42:10

like, "Oh my god, you're Theo. It's so

42:11

cool to see you here. You don't take a

42:13

photo?" That's awesome. I love that. If

42:14

you see me in public and you want to do

42:16

something like that, I'm cool. It's cool

42:17

to know people know who I am and they

42:18

resonate with my content. Usually the

42:20

people who ask for these things would be

42:22

the founders of the dev tool companies.

42:24

Like the people who built a zero

42:26

obviously knew who I was and were hyped

42:28

to see an email from me. We chatted.

42:29

They're now good friends. The developer

42:31

tool companies in the developer space

42:34

should know who I am because like let's

42:36

be real, I have the numbers here.

42:37

According to last state of AI developer

42:38

survey, 54% of respondents watch my

42:41

videos. Do you want to be in the 46%

42:44

that don't keep up? If your job is to

42:47

sell to those people, and also let's be

42:49

real, of the developers that use AI that

42:52

make it into Y Combinator, are they more

42:53

likely to be on the 54% or the 46%.

42:57

Realistically speaking, they're more

42:58

likely to be locked in. This is how it

43:01

is. A lot of the people in the recent

43:02

batches have said how useful my startup

43:04

and startup adjacent videos have been,

43:06

but also how useful my general dev stuff

43:08

and AI coverage videos have been for

43:10

them. So, a lot of these AI for thing

43:13

companies wouldn't be my expected

43:15

demographic. I'm expecting the dev tools

43:17

to be hyped on me and for these guys to

43:19

maybe sometimes know who I am. Almost

43:22

every single one of these companies was

43:24

really hyped about me. I was shocked.

43:27

Like, of the people who came up to me,

43:28

the vast majority were working on [ __ ] I

43:31

didn't know anything about. Like

43:33

healthcare, like mapping software, like

43:36

missiles, like car washes. I don't know

43:39

[ __ ] about any of that. But they were

43:41

coming up to me because they were hyped

43:42

that I was there. And that is so cool

43:44

and heartwarming and awesome. But it was

43:47

counteracted by a very weird change.

43:50

Most of the dev tool companies had no

43:52

[ __ ] idea who I was. I do not know

43:56

what happened here. I am talking about

43:58

businesses that are literally building

44:00

tools for cursor where none of the

44:03

founders have ever heard my name. That's

44:05

not even the funniest one. The funniest

44:07

one by far was a kind of vibe coding

44:11

enterprisey one that's building

44:12

developer tools to help businesses

44:15

integrate custom software faster. And I

44:18

was skeptical. I didn't hear many of the

44:20

things I would expect to hear. It was a

44:21

recent pivot. The revenue wasn't great.

44:23

And they were specifically targeting

44:25

things like Superbase and other like

44:28

data platforms that were harder to vibe

44:30

code against. And I was like, okay, this

44:33

is a bit red flaggy for me. You don't

44:35

know who I am. you're talking about

44:36

Superbase a lot. I don't see the space

44:39

here. Like how are you managing data if

44:41

you're doing this? I had already like

44:43

written this one off like I'm not

44:44

investing in this one. I'm just curious

44:46

how this founder is thinking about this.

44:48

I [ __ ] you not. They reply, "Oh, we

44:50

built it all on convex. They're the only

44:52

backend platform we have found that does

44:54

really well with vibe coding. Have you

44:55

seen their thing, Chef? You know, Chef,

44:57

the vibe coder on the Codex website.

45:00

That was my idea." They didn't know who

45:02

I was and they literally built their

45:04

startup around a thing that only exists

45:05

because of me. I have no idea what the

45:07

[ __ ] happened here. I still invested

45:09

because I thought that was pretty cool.

45:11

That all said, the majority of the dev

45:13

tool companies I talked to had literally

45:15

no idea whatsoever who I was. Maybe

45:17

three of them did and at least five of

45:19

them didn't. That was very interesting

45:23

to me. What this suggests is that the

45:26

dev tool companies are not as locked in

45:28

as they were before. that they are

45:30

trying to find edges in the industry and

45:33

they had a good enough pitch to sneak

45:35

through that. And my hotter take here,

45:37

and this one might get me in a little

45:38

bit of trouble, but uh I can't just

45:40

glaze the whole time, right? Why

45:41

Combinator puts out a request for

45:43

startups right before every batch? The

45:45

partners who are all founders, by the

45:47

way, YC doesn't have investors that work

45:49

there. Everybody there has built a

45:51

company. So these founders now partners

45:53

will describe things that they want to

45:55

see more of in the batch in hopes that

45:57

people will apply with ideas that are

45:58

similar to this. Most of these people

46:01

are what I would call exdevelopers.

46:04

I am a part-time developer who will

46:06

eventually be an ex-developer. I just

46:07

cannot justify writing code for the

46:09

majority of my time nowadays, especially

46:10

with one hand. I miss it dearly. I'll

46:12

get back to it soon. But most of the Y

46:15

cominator partners have been writing

46:17

code for some amount of their career and

46:20

they all notice this trend where we need

46:22

the companies that really understand a

46:24

field well. So let's go to Nautilus

46:27

again for a sec. If you don't know jack

46:29

[ __ ] about car washes and this you have

46:32

two potential investments. One is a

46:35

company that knows AI really well that

46:37

doesn't know car washes that well and

46:39

they say a bunch of things you don't

46:41

really know if they're true or not. And

46:42

the other option, we're on the

46:44

carwash.com podcast. We help run

46:47

multiple webinars about car washes. I've

46:49

been working at them since I was 16 and

46:50

here's all the things I've done. One of

46:52

those is obviously the good investment.

46:54

And it's very easy to know that without

46:56

having any experience in the space. My

46:58

spicy take, and this hurts, and I'm

47:01

sorry to the partners that feel like

47:02

this is a call out. It is not meant to

47:03

be. It is more an observation than a

47:04

call out. I am sorry. There's a Dunning

47:06

Krueger thing here. If you know nothing

47:09

about car washes, you pick the person

47:11

who knows about car washes. If you know

47:13

a little about car washes, you pick the

47:15

person who you think based on their

47:18

knowledge of whatever you're interested

47:20

in, you think has the most capability of

47:22

success. Once you know enough more at

47:25

the end of the Dunning Kruger, you

47:26

realize the person who knows more is

47:27

much more likely to succeed than me. You

47:29

pick them again. So if we draw this out

47:31

as a Dunning Krueger curve where as you

47:34

start learning the thing, you get really

47:36

confident. As you get further, you

47:38

realize you're clueless. And then you

47:39

slowly build up real knowledge. If your

47:42

current understanding of car washes is

47:44

here, you pick the person who knows what

47:46

they're doing. If your current

47:47

understanding of car washes is here, you

47:50

pick the person who knows what they're

47:51

doing. Your understanding is here.

47:53

Doesn't matter. You're going to pick the

47:54

right person anyways. But what if your

47:55

understanding is here? If you know a

47:57

decent bit about car washes, but you

47:59

think you know everything about them,

48:01

this is when you start making edgy bets.

48:03

If the person that the car wash company

48:05

talked to knew a bit about car washes,

48:07

they might have made dumb decisions.

48:09

Replace the word car wash with software.

48:12

Now imagine you don't know jack [ __ ]

48:14

about coding. And you talk to somebody

48:16

who's really deep in the software

48:18

development space. They have years of

48:19

expertise. They've been working in open

48:21

source forever. They are involved in the

48:23

open source communities that I and

48:25

people like me care about. They watch

48:27

all my videos. They're deep in the

48:28

space. and now they're talking to a YC

48:30

partner who doesn't know jack [ __ ] about

48:33

software development. If this person

48:35

seems deep and excited about the thing

48:37

you don't know jack [ __ ] about, good

48:39

chance they know what they're doing. If

48:41

you've been writing software for a

48:42

while, but haven't in a long time, and

48:44

you know what it took to keep up, you

48:46

know how important it was to be locked

48:48

in, to keep up with what's going on in

48:49

the industry, you know how the trends

48:50

shift and change and all of that. You

48:52

pick the person who deeply knows the

48:54

thing. Let's say you recently got into

48:56

vibe coding after not coding for 10

48:57

years. And you're like, "Oh my god, I

48:59

had no idea coding was so easy. Being a

49:00

good coder doesn't matter that much

49:01

anymore. Anyone can just vibe code their

49:03

way through Cursor and Windsurf." By the

49:05

way, Windinsurf and Cursor basically the

49:07

same thing. Windsurf's a little cheaper.

49:09

You should probably use that. Those

49:11

types of people will pick the startup

49:14

that they think has the most likelihood

49:15

of being worth billions, not the one

49:17

that understands the space the best. My

49:20

honest belief is that the recent surge

49:22

of YC developer tools that don't know

49:25

jack [ __ ] about the developer space is

49:27

because there are partners at YC that

49:30

are currently here in the Dunning

49:31

Krueger curve of how software

49:33

development works. And they are saying

49:35

stupid things, attracting stupid

49:37

founders that bark back the same stupid

49:39

beliefs they have that result in

49:41

mediocre at best and destructive at

49:43

worst developer tool companies ending up

49:45

in the batch. And I am not saying this

49:47

is all of them. I would say this is at

49:49

worst half of them, but there are more

49:52

of these clueless developer tools

49:54

companies than there are clueless

49:56

non-developer tools companies altogether

49:58

combined. So, it's funny that we went

50:00

from the AI dev tool companies

50:02

understanding dev well cuz you had to

50:03

understand dev to do anything to the AI

50:05

dev tool companies being the only AI for

50:08

X companies in the batch that don't

50:10

actually understand the developer space

50:11

that well. Of the 18 investments or so I

50:14

did in this batch, I'm pretty sure I hit

50:17

two developer tool companies total.

50:20

Depends on if you count Bitriig or not.

50:21

Their audience isn't devs, but you get

50:23

the idea. Two to three of my 18

50:25

investments were dev tools. In previous

50:28

batches, it's over half. It's also a

50:30

smaller number. It's usually like 8 to

50:32

10. So, this is a really good batch of

50:34

people who were really locked in on the

50:36

thing that they are doing. That is a

50:38

huge industry shift and I genuinely

50:40

really hope it maintains because the

50:42

summer 25 batch is the best YC batch

50:45

I've ever seen as long as you don't look

50:47

at the dev tools too hard. Think that's

50:50

all I have to say about this one. What a

50:52

chaotic experience it has been talking

50:54

to dev tools who have no idea what we're

50:56

doing in the space and talking to car

50:58

wash companies that couldn't be more

50:59

hyped to talk with me about the dev

51:01

stuff that they're doing to make car

51:02

washes better. I did not make a lot of

51:05

money from this yet. In fact, it was a

51:07

very expensive week for me. Thank you to

51:09

my sponsors and thank you to all of you

51:10

for watching and making this possible.

51:12

But hopefully, if all goes well in 5 to

51:14

10 years, the sponsors for this channel

51:16

will be the companies I invested in

51:17

instead of the companies funding my

51:19

investments. Thank you again to everyone

51:21

for watching this. I hope it's helpful

51:22

for y'all to better understand how these

51:24

startups work and how I think about them

51:25

and most importantly, how I make my

51:27

investment decisions. I am not like many

51:29

other investors. So, don't assume that

51:31

what I talk about here is going to get

51:33

you an investment because the majority

51:34

of the investors I talk to don't know

51:36

jack [ __ ] about anything. I am trying to

51:38

explain this is this cool weird

51:40

in-between position that I happen to be

51:41

in and I hope it was useful to somebody.

51:43

I know this video would have been very

51:44

useful to me not very long ago. Let me

51:47

know what y'all think. Until next time,

51:49

peace nerds.

Video Information

YouTube ID: L3vToC1jO64
Added: Sep 20, 2025
Last Updated: 5 months ago