ÚLTIMA HORA | Mario Draghi avisa a Europa del desastre: estos son los grandes riesgos
Duration
35:45
Captions
1
Language
EN
Published
Sep 16, 2025
Description
ÚLTIMA HORA | Mario Draghi avisa a Europa del desastre: estos son los grandes riesgos Mario Draghi, hace un año después balance de su famoso informe Draghi, en el que advertía a la Unión Europea de todos los riesgos a los que se enfrentaba el Viejo Continente. Draghi en esta ocasión ha lanzado una advertencia contundente sobre el rumbo de Europa: “Cada desafío se ha agudizado y nuestra capacidad de respuesta está limitada por la dependencia energética”. Draghi fue claro al pedir una reforma amplia con normas más sencillas, ya que “las regulaciones actuales frenan la competitividad” y “la industria no puede esperar hasta 2027, debe acelerar de inmediato”. Llama a Europa a actuar menos como una confederación y más como una federación, y sostuvo que cuanto más se impulsen las reformas, “más capital privado se activará”. Para Draghi, “la línea entre economía y seguridad es cada vez más borrosa” y los plazos de transformación deben ser “ambiciosos, pero reales”. #ultimahora #draghi #europa #riesgos #unióneuropea #economia #industria #burocracia #seguridad #geopolitica #negociostv Si quieres entrar en la Academia de Negocios TV, este es el enlace: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwd8Byi93KbnsYmCcKLExvQ/join Síguenos en directo ➡️ https://bit.ly/2Ts9V3p Suscríbete a nuestro canal: https://bit.ly/3jsMzp2 Suscríbete a nuestro segundo canal, másnegocios: https://n9.cl/4dca4 Visita Negocios TV https://bit.ly/2Ts9V3p Más vídeos de Negocios TV: https://youtube.com/@NegociosTV Síguenos en Telegram: https://t.me/negociostv Síguenos en Instagram: https://bit.ly/3oytWnd Twitter: https://bit.ly/3jz6Lpt Facebook: https://bit.ly/3e3kIuy 🔞Exención de responsabilidad: Toda la información, material y / o contenido incluido en este programa es sólo para fines informativos y educativos. Invertir en acciones, opciones y futuros es arriesgado y no es adecuado para todos los inversores. Consulte a su propio asesor financiero independiente antes de tomar cualquier decisión de inversión. Negocios TV no se hace responsable de las opiniones expresadas en el vídeo.
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my best.
One year ago, we met here to discuss
three challenges set out in the report.
Europe's growth model had long been
under strain.
dependencies
threatened its resilience.
And without faster growth, Europe would
be unable to deliver on its climate,
digital, and security ambitions, not to
mention finance its aging societies.
Over the past year, each of these
challenges has grown more acute.
The foundations of Europe's growth,
expanding world trade, and high value
exports have weakened further.
The US has imposed its highest tariffs
since the smooth holy era.
China has become an even stronger
competitor
both in third markets and as US tariffs
divert flows inside Europe itself.
Since December last year, China's trade
surplus with the European Union has
risen by almost 20%.
We've also seen how Europe's ability to
respond is limited by its dependencies
even when our economic weight is and
remains considerable.
Reliance on the US for defense was
quoted as one of the reasons we had to
accept a trade deal largely on American
terms.
Dependence on Chinese critical materials
has curtled our ability to prevent
China's over capacity from flooding
Europe or to counter its support for
Russia.
Europe
has begun to respond. Since the US
absorbs around three quarters of the
global current account deficit,
diversifying away from its market is
unrealistic in the short term.
But for example, the Marosour deal with
Latin America can offer relief for
exporters.
The commission has launched strategic
projects for critical raw materials and
defense spending is rising sharply.
These defense commitments however add to
already vast financing needs. The ECB
now puts annual investment requirements
annual for 2531
at nearly 1.2 2 trillions
up from 800 billion a year ago.
The public share has almost doubled from
24% to 43%
an extra half a trillion a year as
defense is mainly publicly funded.
Fiscal space is scarce
and without this new spending, EU public
debt is set to rise 10 percentage points
over the next decade, reaching 93% of
GDP on growth assumptions that are more
optimistic than what it is at the
present day.
One year on, Europe is therefore in a
harder place.
Our growth model is fading.
Vulnerabilities are mounting and there
is no clear path to finance the
investments we need
and we've been reminded painfully that
inaction threatens not only our
competitiveness but also our
sovereignty.
The report set out three priorities for
Europe. closing the innovation gap in
advanced technologies,
charting a decarbonization path that
supports growth and strengthening
economic security.
As President Fonda lines has underlined,
these are also at the heart of the
commission's agenda and I welcome her
decision to place competitiveness at the
center and the program is ambitious.
Europe's citizens and companies value
the diagnosis, the clear priorities and
the action plans, but they also express
growing frustration.
They are disappointed by how slowly the
EU moves. They see us failing to match
the speed of change elsewhere.
They are ready to act but fear
governments have not grasped the gravity
of the moment.
Too often excuses are made for our
slowness.
We say it's simply how the EU is built
that a complex process with many actors
must be respected.
Sometimes
inertia is even presented as respect for
the rule of law.
I think that's complacency.
Competitors in US and China are far less
constrained even when acting within the
law. To carry on as usual is to resign
ourselves to falling behind.
A different path demands new speed,
scale, and intensity.
It means acting together, not
fragmenting our efforts. It means
focusing resources where impact is
greatest. And it means delivering
results within months not years.
Start with technology.
AI is often called a transformational
technology like electricity 140 years
ago.
But it depends on the orchestration of
at least four other technologies. Cloud
to store vast data. Supercomputing to
process that data. cyber security to
protect sensitive sectors and advanced
networks, 5G, fiber, satellites for
transmission.
In some of these areas, Europe shows
progress. Plans underway for at least
five AI gigafactories,
each with more than 100,000 advanced
GPUs.
Data center capacity is set to triple
over the next seven years.
A major telecom reform is expected by
year end.
ASML's recent investment in Mistral
is a promising signal for domestic AI
ecosystem.
Adoption is rising too. As the president
just reminded us, the EIB finds European
firms are taking up advanced
technologies at the pace close to US
peers, though from a lower base.
But the gaps are stark.
On the AI frontier, the US produced 40
large foundation models last year, China
15, the EU just three.
Among SMEs, AI adoption is still low,
ranging from 13 to 21%.
And in the most strategic field, AI
built on European intellectual property
to anchor our core industry, progress is
minimal.
There are three areas where more
ambition is needed.
First, as the president has remarked
before, removing barriers to scaling up
new technologies.
A true 28th regime must become reality,
allowing innovative firms to operate
trade and raise financing seamlessly
across all 27 member states, just as
competitors can in other large
economies.
This is especially important to give
young Europeans a chance in their
continent.
They want to stay here. They don't want
to go elsewhere to have success.
The commission is moving in this
direction.
But with uncertain backing from member
states, the first step towards the 28th
regime will likely be limited to a
digital business identity.
Early stage funding also needs stronger
backing.
The Scale Up Europe fund can help
startups grow if its size matches their
financial needs.
The planned increase of Horizon Europe
275 billion is welcome,
but for breakthrough research, this will
fall short unless the additional
resources are concentrated into sizable
priority programs.
Resources must flow into centers of
excellence. They must focus on
high-risk, highreward projects chosen
through a DARPA style process. They must
be reinforced by strong industry
linkages to academic institutions to
turn research into real applications.
Implementation must rest with expert
project managers, not bureaucrats.
and Europe should be capable of making
direct investments in a few large
strategic deep tech initiative.
The second area is regulation
across European companies. One of the
clearest demands is for a radical
simplification of GDPR,
not just the primary law, but also the
heavy gold plating by member states.
Training AI models requires vast amounts
of public web data.
Yet, legal uncertainty over its use
creates costly delays, slowing
deployment in Europe.
Research backs this up. GDPR has raised
the cost of data by about 20% for EU
firms compared with US peers. Yet the
only change on the table so far is an
easing of record keeping keeping and
extending deroggations to meet caps.
Broader reform towards simpler
harmonized rules is still vague.
The AI act is another source of
uncertainty.
The first rules
which included the ban on unacceptable
risk systems landed without major
complications.
Codes of practice signed by most major
developers together with the commission
August commission's August guidelines
have clarified responsibilities.
But the next stage covering high-risk AI
systems in areas like critical
infrastructure and health must be
proportionate and support innovation and
development.
In my view, implementation of this stage
should be posed until we better
understand the drawbacks.
More broadly, enforcement should rest on
expost assessment, judging models by
their real world capabilities and
demonstrated risks.
The third area is the vertical
integration of AI into industry.
Sectoral AI applications are even more
critical than raw supercomputing power.
Here, Europe has a real advantage. Its
firms hold more than half the global
market in industrial automation
solutions, a cornstone of industrial AI.
Yet only around 10% of manufacturing
firms used AI last year.
Industry and governments must work
together to turn this head start into
proprietary European solutions. The
commission's apply AI strategy. this
autumn will be a key test.
Natural gas prices in EU are still
nearly four times higher than in the
United States.
Industrial power prices are on average
more than double. Unless this gap
narrows, the transition to high-tech
economy will stall.
Energy is as fundamental as technology
in driving AI.
Electricity demand by data centers in
Europe will rise by 70% in 2030.
Power already accounts for up to 40% of
their operating costs.
The IEA
warns that without action, one in five
plant projects globally could be delayed
by great bottlenecks.
Only countries only countries that align
energy strategy with digital policy will
capture the largest gains in the AI
race.
The commission has launched its clean
industrial deal. deal and the action
plan for affordable energy, both
consistent with the report's agenda.
But the main step so far has been to
relax state aid rules so member states
can subsidize prices.
That may offer temporary relief, but it
doesn't fix the structural reasons why
energy in Europe is so expensive.
This includes gas prices that following
Russia's invasion of Ukraine are still
about double their precoid levels.
A pricing system in which gas still sets
the market price for electricity most of
the time even as renewables expand
and high charges and taxes.
Decarbonization.
Let's get this straight. Decarbonization
is the best long-term path for Europe to
achieve energy independence despite its
lack of natural resources.
But it requires much faster investment
to make a renewables heavy system work
in grids, interconnectors
and cleanbased load generation such as
nuclear.
Today half of the crossber capacity
needed by 2030 has no investment plan.
Even approved projects take more than 10
years with half time lost to permitting.
The grid package due at the end of this
year and the proposed budget increase
for crossber links are step forward.
But the current system national
coordination of permits and financing is
not fit for a European energy market.
Crossber projects need EU level planning
and execution.
At the same time, we must be realistic.
These measures will not cut energy
prices quickly.
That is why we must act on the levers
that can deliver faster relief
to stand out.
Improving the functioning of gas markets
and loosening the grip of gas on
electricity prices.
Europe is already the world's largest
buyer of US LNG
and has committed to purchase up to $750
billion in US energy products.
Whatever the conditions of that deal, it
should be treated as a chance to
reorganize how we purchase gas.
Since March, LG landed in Europe has
cost from 60 to 90% more than the same
gas would cost in the United States,
even after accounting for logistics and
regification.
Collective EU purchasing as first
proposed by the commission after
Russia's invasion could certainly narrow
this gap by strengthening our bargaining
power, reducing intermediaries margins
and shielding us from volatile spot
markets.
In parallel, Europe must deliver on the
work of gas market task force and bring
more transparency to energy trading.
Profits for the four largest global
traders quadrupled between 20 and 22.
Joint supervision and a stronger rule
book are overdue.
We must then decouple the remuneration
of renewables and nuclear from fossil
generation by expanding contracted
energy meaning purchasing power
agreements and two ways contracts for
difference.
Some useful initiatives are underway
such as the IB's pilot PPA purchasing
power agreement guarantee,
but far more decisive action is needed.
Long-term contracts must be extended to
all renewables and nuclear assets, new
as it is today, but also existing alike.
The current mechanism for setting prices
simply awards huge rents to many vested
interests.
As we press ahead with decarbonization,
the transition must also be flexible and
pragmatic.
The commission has eased some of the
most honorous reporting requirements
through its omnibus on sustainability.
But in some sectors such as automotives,
targets rest on assumptions that no
longer hold.
The 2035 deadline for zero tailpipe
emissions was meant to trigger a virtue
circle.
Firm targets would drive investment in
charging infrastructure,
grow the home market, spur innovation in
Europe, and make EV models, electric
vehicles models cheaper.
Adjacent industries, batteries, chips
were expected to develop alongside
supported by targeted industrial policy.
But this hasn't happened.
Charging point installation must
accelerate three to fourfold in the next
five years to reach adequate coverage.
The EV market has grown more slowly than
expected.
European innovation has lagged,
models remain expansive and supply chain
is fragmented.
In fact, the European car fleet of 250
million vehicles
is aging
and CO2 emissions have barely fallen in
recent years
as suggested in the report. The upcoming
review of the CO2 emissions regulation
should follow a technological neutral
approach and take stock of market and
technological developments.
We also need a joint up approach to the
ramp up of EVs, covering supply chains,
infrastructure needs, and the potential
of carbon neutral fuels.
In the coming months, the automotive
sector will test Europe's ability to
align regulation, infrastructure, and
supply chain development into a coherent
strategy for an industry. Let's not
forget that employs more than 13 million
people across the value chain.
The report called for using industrial
policy actively to cut dependencies and
guard against state sponsored
competition.
At the time, concerns were raised about
economic nationalism, protectionism, and
the risk that Europe might abandon
global rules.
But the past year has shown clearly that
we are operating in a different world.
The line between economy and security is
increasingly blurred.
States are using every tool at their
disposal to advance their interests.
So far, Europe's response has fallen
into two traps. uncoordinated national
efforts or blind faith that market force
will build new sectors. The first can
never deliver scale.
The second is impossible when others
distort markets and tilt the level
playing field.
Instead, we must build the capacity to
defend ourselves and withstand pressure
at key choke points. Defense, heavy
industry, and the technologies that will
shape the future.
Three levers can give us the scale and
intensity we need.
The first is a new approach to
coordinating state aid.
In practice, state aid often acts as
protectionism,
locking activity within borders instead
of building European industries that are
globally competitive.
IMF research shows that aid in one
country often comes at the expense of
growth in its neighbors.
Europe does have coordination tools such
as important projects of common European
interests
which can focus support and reduce these
spillovers.
Yet in 2023,
EU countries spent nearly 190 billion
euros on state aid, five times more than
has been allocated to IPCIs since 2018.
Used strategically, IPCIs could help
Europe achieve scale in sectors like
innovative nuclear technologies such as
small modular reactors or in the
automotive supply chain for affordable
zero and low emission vehicles.
The commission is taking measures to
make such projects more attractive and
accessible.
But the EPCI model is still essentially
national in design and funding
and this creates an inherent ceiling
compared to our competitors.
Take Europe semiconductor IPCI approved
in 2023.
It mobilized 80 billion euros of public
funding spread across 14 member states,
68 projects, and 56 companies.
The overarching target reaching a 20%
global share of semiconductor
manufacturing by 2030
is one the European Court of Auditors
already calls very unlikely.
As a comparison taker, Japan's rapidus
shows a different approach. Created in
2022,
it channels 12 billion dollar of public
support despite Japan's smaller economy
into a single largecale leader in
advanced chips. It is focused on clear
objective backed by major firms as
investors and anchor customers
and it moves far faster aiming for mass
production by 2027.
Europe should learn from this
concentrated model and extend it to
other adv to other advanced technologies
combining public and private investment
for disruptive innovation and largecale
industrial projects.
The second level is public procurement.
State aid cannot build new supply in
critical technologies without matching
European demand.
Regulation can help by removing barriers
to adoption. But procurement is the most
powerful tool to create markets.
It works in two ways. With total public
procurement equal to 16% of EU GDP,
directing even a small share to European
industries would create stable demand
for innovation and strengthen strategic
sectors.
Second,
in industries where scale is decisive,
harmonized rules can drive
standardization
and sustain long capital intensive
investment cycle.
The potential is clear among across many
sectors. Reserving an EU share in
defense cheap procurement,
supporting European cloud and vertical
AI or setting quotas for clean tech
products such as green steel and
aluminum.
Work has become has begun on
preferential EU procurement rules for
the public sector, though details still
are unclear.
But success will depend on harmonization
across member states.
Without it, procurement like state aid
risk sliding into national protectionism
and failing to deliver the necessary
scale.
The third lever is competition policy.
Here I will basically
reiterate what the president just said.
In defense and space and the dual use
technologies that underpin them, market
dynamics are very different from
consumer markets.
Here consolidation is not necessarily a
threat to consumers. It can be a way to
cut duplicated R&D, lower costs,
accelerate innovation and focus
procurement budgets.
Competitors in US and Asia benefit not
only from state support and vast
procurement markets, but also from
consolidation in these sectors.
Yet, Europe remains split between
multiple national champions and
overlapping industrial bases. Europe
should be able to protect competition
while still promoting consolidation and
innovation.
A review of merger guidelines is
underway,
but industry can't wait until 2027. By
the way, this deadline is actually
consistent with the procedure that was
chosen originally.
Resilience and innovation must be built
into competition policy. Now
at a minimum a fasttrack process should
be established immediately.
The next question is how to increase
speed.
In some areas the EU can do more with
the powers it it already has. Regulation
is where the union can act fastest and
most decisively.
Europe has long styled itself as a
regulatory power. It ma must now approve
it can adapt to a fast fastch changing
technological landscape.
In other areas deeper reform is needed
of competences decision making and
financing.
Ultimately in some crucial areas Europe
must act in less like a confederation
and more like a federation.
But such reform will take time. Time we
may not have.
In the meantime, progress may depend on
coalitions of the willing using
mechanisms such as enhanced cooperation.
Even without treaty change, Europe could
already go much further by concentrating
projects and pooling resources.
If we f if we succeed in focusing our
efforts in this way, the logical next
step is to consider common debt for
common projects
whether at EU level or among a coalition
of member states to amplify the benefits
of coordination.
Joint issuance would not magically
expand fiscal space, but it would allow
Europe to finance larger projects in
areas that lift productivity,
breakthrough innovation, scale
technologies, defense R&D, or energy
grids where fragmented national spending
can no longer deliver.
By raising output faster than interest
costs, such projects will gradually
restore fiscal space and make broader
investment needs easier to finance. The
report estimated that even a modest 2%
increase in total factor productivity
over a decade could cut public finance
burden by onethird.
And if we lower barriers in the single
market and let firms scale faster, we
will also accelerate the growth of
European capital markets.
This can help finance the private share
of investment needs. In substance, the
more we push reforms, and this is a
point I made several time times, the
more we push reforms, the more private
capital we step up and the less public
money we will need. Of
course, this path will break
long-standing taboss,
but the rest of the world has already
broken theirs.
For Europe's survival, we must do what
has not been done before and refuse to
be held back by self-imposed limits.
Most importantly,
we must move beyond broad strategies and
backloaded timelines.
We need concrete dates and deliverables
and to be held account accountable for
them.
Deadlines should be ambitious enough to
demand real focus and collective effort.
This was the formula behind Europe's
most successful projects, the single
market and the euro.
both advanced through clear phase, firm
milestones and sustained political
commitment.
And I will conclude on the same lines as
also a moment ago.
Europe citizens are asking that their
leaders raise their eyes from their
daily concerns towards their common
European destiny and grasp the scale of
the challenge.
only unity of intent and urgency of
response will show that they are ready
to meet extraordinary times with
extraordinary action. Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Mario.
Central.
Institutionality.